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Daniel Yacavone maintains that none of the existent approaches to cinema – theoretical, 
analytic, or phenomenological – succeed in grasping the uniqueness of the art form.  He sets 
out to address this deficiency in Film Worlds, advancing a tripartite model of cinematic 
aesthetics that draws on paradigms established by Nelson Goodman, Mikel Dufrenne, and 
Martin Heidegger respectively.  The monograph consists of an introduction followed by eight 
chapters divided into four parts, one each on: film worlds, cinematic representation 
(Goodman), cinematic expression (Dufrenne), and cinematic truth (Heidegger).  Part II, 
comprising an extended analysis of Goodman’s Languages of Art and Ways of Worldmaking 
as applied to cinema, is the most substantial and satisfying, offering a theory of cinematic 
representation which is grounded in Goodman’s aesthetics and likely to appeal to 
philosophers working in both the analytic and what I shall for the sake of brevity call 
“continental” traditions.  In consequence, Yacavone’s stated aim of replacing existing 
philosophical and theoretical approaches to narrative film is to at least some extent achieved. 
 
As the title of his book suggests, the concept of a film world is crucial to Yacavone’s model.  
He distinguishes cinematic art from the cinematic medium (on the basis that the latter 
underdetermines the former) in the introduction and then the world-in a film from the world-
of a film in Part I.  The world-in is the diegetic world of the narrative representation and the 
world-of the multidimensional aesthetic world of the artwork.  Yacavone is primarily 
interested in the latter and film world and film work are further differentiated (again, on the 
basis that the latter underdetermines the former), with the film world defined as ‘a singular, 
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holistic, relational, and fundamentally referential reality’ that provides audiences with 
experiences which are simultaneously cognitive, immersive, and sensuous (xiv).  The 
difference between the world-in and world-of is elaborated upon in terms of Christian Metz’s 
distinction between denotation (literal representation by the camera) and connotation (non-
literal representation requiring interpretation) such that the following dichotomy is 
established: denotational, fictional, and representational aspects on the one hand and 
connotational, aesthetic, and presentational aspects on the other (33-34).  The film world is 
constituted by the world-in, the world-of, and the relations between them. 
 
In Part II, Yacavone matches his conception of film worlds to Goodman’s theory of artistic 
world-making and performs an expert mutual exegesis.  First and foremost, he demonstrates 
that cinematic works of art are paradigmatic examples of Goodman’s world-making (and 
symbol systems) and establishes an account of cinematic representation based on Goodman’s 
aesthetics.  Second, he explains Goodman’s theories of world-making and reference by using 
cinematic examples to offer fresh insight into Goodman’s oeuvre, and the elucidation of 
Goodman’s five principles of world-making in chapter four is particularly compelling (88-
110).  Chapter five employs Goodman’s theory of exemplification to further illuminate the 
distinction between the world-in and world-of a film.  Where the world-in represents the 
narrative visually, the world-of presents the work as an intentional object with sensory, 
affective, and cognitive dimensions.  Like the tailor’s swatch, therefore, film worlds are 
instances of “possession plus reference”, referring to their representations and possessing 
self-reflexive ‘extranarrative symbolization’ (123).  The cinematic work of art thus draws 
attention to both its represented reality and to itself as an aesthetic object.      
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Remaining true to his core thesis, however, Yacavone holds that his application of 
Goodman’s aesthetics to cinema also underdetermines the art form.  He therefore proceeds, in 
part three, to phenomenological approaches in order to explain the experiential dimension of 
film, focusing on the relationship between film and emotion.  In chapter 6, Yacavone offers 
an original, albeit incomplete, account of cinematic expression based on the distinction 
between two types of expression, local and global.  Local expression is further differentiated 
into three discrete but usually overlapping aspects of the world-in: sensory-affective, 
cognitive-diegetic, and formal-artistic.  Local expression contributes to, and is complemented 
by, the global expression characteristic of the world-of, ‘cineaesthetic expression (cinematic 
world-feeling)’ (213).  Global expression is linked to the style of the auteur, which is 
elucidated in terms of cinematic rhythm and it is in his discussion of rhythm in chapter seven 
that Yacavone utilises Dufrenne’s work on the complex issue of cinematic temporality.  Part 
IV, like Part I, consists of a single chapter and seeks to explain the relationship between film 
worlds and truth by means of the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Heidegger.  
Employing terminology from the latter, Yacavone proposes the cinematic experience as an 
event which, like the film world itself, has a multidimensional character: as a temporal and 
spatial event and as a transformative hermeneutic event in which truth is disclosed (245).  He 
concludes by reiterating his commitment to rediscovering the work of others rather than 
creating an original theory, but I think he is being too modest as both the application of 
Goodman’s aesthetics to cinema and Yacavone’s own theory of cinematic expression make 
new and valuable contributions to the field. 
  
Yacavone’s self-effacement introduces the first of two criticisms I shall make.  The most 
substantial part of the book is, as I have noted, the engagement with Goodman and at the 
beginning of chapter seven Yacavone describes his approach thus far as ‘predominantly 
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analytic and cognitive’ (190).  This is extremely misleading as while chapters four and five 
are indeed concerned with Goodman’s (analytic) aesthetics, Yacavone’s treatment of his 
subject is firmly rooted in the continental traditional.  One of the features of his approach that 
will be immediately apparent to philosophers of film is the absence of a sustained argument 
moving from premises to conclusion.  Yacavone admits that his monograph involves an 
application of various paradigms to cinematic art rather than a defence of those paradigms, 
but readers on the analytic side of the divide – and perhaps others – will nonetheless require 
an argument for or defence of his selection of applied paradigms (xx).  In other words, while 
it would be unreasonable to expect Yacavone to deal with objections to Goodman’s aesthetics 
it is not unreasonable to expect him to defend his application of Goodman’s aesthetics to 
cinematic art.  Even if one accepts Yacavone’s initial conception of film worlds (and I see no 
reason not to), it is disappointing that he fails to identify and address potential problems with 
their development in terms of Goodman, e.g. the inadequacy of exemplification as a 
clarification of cinematic reference.  In his endorsement, Professor Dudley Andrew describes 
the book as a ‘prodigious satellite mapping of the terrae incognitae’ (back cover).  An 
unsympathetic philosopher of film could, with some justification, claim that Yacavone has 
done nothing more than map a genealogy of philosophical and theoretical ideas for 
appropriation in the analysis of cinema as an art form.  In this respect, one might say that the 
work really consists of three parts.  The first begins (rather surprisingly, given the numerous 
problems associated with his work), with Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten and progresses to 
Susanne Langer and thence to Goodman; the history then moves from Ernest Cassirer to 
Langer and Goodman; and then from Langer and Goodman to Jean Mitry and Pier Paolo 
Pasolini (chapters one to three) before folding back on Goodman in the second part (chapters 
four and five).  The third part embarks on another genealogy, beginning with Mitry and 
Pasolini, moving through Dufrenne to Andrew Sarris and Gadamer; and then from Gadamer 
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to Heidegger before folding back on Goodman once again.  To make such a criticism of the 
whole book would be unduly harsh, but chapters two and three are little more than histories 
of cinematic ideas broadly-construed.  More importantly, the absence of both an explicit 
overarching argument and discussions of objections to the paradigm selections leave 
Yacavone vulnerable to accusations that the work is merely a mapping of the territory, even if 
a highly informed and enlightening one.  It would be a mistake to characterise Film Worlds in 
this way, as it has much more to offer, but I suspect that the book will be of more interest to 
readers working in the continental tradition than the analytic. 
 
My second criticism is the breadth – as opposed to depth – of Yacavone’s study.  Part IV, like 
Part I, consists of a single chapter in which he attempts to provide: (i) an exegesis of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, (ii) an exegesis of Heidegger’s hermeneutics, (iii) an explanation of 
how Heidegger’s hermeneutics illuminates cinematic truth, (iv) a theory of artistic value, and 
(v) a conclusion to the monograph.  Needless to say, the task is impossible and fails on all 
counts except for the last.  My main concern with Yacavone’s breadth is not that he covers 
too many theories in too little detail (a flaw which applies to the final chapter alone), but that 
in devoting so much space to the work of others, he leaves insufficient room to develop his 
most promising contributions.  The application of Goodman’s aesthetics to cinematic art is, 
as I have noted, both comprehensive and convincing, but the most original and interesting 
part of the work, the discussion of cinematic expression, is regrettably abridged.  The 
relationship between local and global expression is not fully explained: i.e., it is not clear 
whether cineaesthetic expression is dependent upon the local forms of expression or if it 
complements them independently or – if the latter – how cineaesthetic expression differs 
from formal-artistic expression, which is also to some extent determined by the intention of 
the auteur.  Similarly, the significance of cinematic rhythm is elucidated with respect to 
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cinematic style, but not cinematic expression, and the relation between rhythm and 
expression is not fully articulated.  The conception of cinematic rhythm itself, which has been 
proposed as the essence of cinematic art by directors such as Sergei Eisenstein and Robert 
Bresson, is presented by Yacavone as possessing great explanatory power, but does not 
receive the attention it demands.  The failure to develop a fully-fledged theory of cinematic 
expression becomes all the more disappointing when the chapters on expression are 
succeeded by the hasty discussion of philosophical hermeneutics.  The brief exegeses of 
Gadamer and Heidegger not only fail to contribute to Yacavone’s model of cinematic 
aesthetics, but detract from it.  Cinematic truth is expounded in Heideggerian jargon, e.g. “the 
being of beings”’ and ‘“unconcealedness”’ – terms which will not impress readers unversed 
in Heidegger’s abstruse aesthetics and which are inadequately explained by Yacavone in the 
few pages devoted to them (249).  If Yacavone wanted to explore the relation between film 
worlds and truth, one wonders why he did not return to Goodman, developing the latter’s 
conception of aesthetics as a branch of epistemology distinct from, but not inferior to, science 
as a way of understanding the world.  Yacavone briefly mentions Goodman’s rightness as 
opposed to truth, but even if Goodman’s claims about the epistemological value of art are not 
fit for purpose the recourse to Heidegger at so late a stage is unfortunate (255). 
 
Despite these reservations, Film Worlds undoubtedly makes a significant contribution to 
philosophical aesthetics on at least two levels: first, to articulate what the cinematic is; and 
second, to accord cinematic art the recognition it deserves but which has – in the analytic 
tradition at least – been largely withheld (notable exceptions such as Noël Carroll, Gregory 
Currie, and Berys Gaut aside).  In the course of his discussion of film worlds, Yacavone 
offers a definition of cinema as a necessarily hybrid art form, combining the aesthetic 
features of painting, theatre, literature, and music with the exclusively (and essentially) 
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cinematic features of ‘camera movement and editing, and the particularly cinematic coupling 
of sound (including music) and image’ (188).  Yacavone not only shows what is unique about 
film, but also why – because of the complexity associated with this hybridity – it is a 
paradigmatic art form, at least as valuable as its constituents.  Film Worlds falls short in 
failing to develop its most promising points, but succeeds in revealing the deficiencies of 
many philosophical and theoretical approaches to cinematic art.  As such, the book will make 
a valuable addition to the libraries of film theorists and philosophers working in the 
continental tradition as well as to philosophers of film who value engagement with work 
outside of the analytic tradition. 
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